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A NEW ADMINISTRATION: BEYOND^ORDISM AND THE SELF-DECEIVING STATE 
Abstract 
The emerging ideology and practices of reversáis conflict with normal 
professionalism and normal bureaucracy. In India, change is impeded by 
culture, bureaucratic conservatism and corruption. Fordist reflexes are 
normal, in which standard solutions are imposed on diverse environments. 
Fordist programmes often misfit local conditions, but are sustained by the 
false positive feedback of a self-deceiving state. 
Agricultural research and extensión, canal irrigation and waterbed 
management present cases both of inappropriate large-scale Fordism and of 
new, though small-scale, approaches and opportunities for reversáis. For 
the future, decentralisation, open communications of rights, and 
organisation of demand from the grassroots provide means to moderate 
Fordism, reduce falsehood in Government administration, and support a new 
style and mode of administration. For such change, personal reversáis by 
influential officials are crucial. 
Note 
"Fordism" and "Fordist" are used in this paper to refer to 
organisations, processes, attitudes and beh.viour analygous 
to Henry Ford 1s automobile industry, exhibiting hierarchy, 
blueprinting, standardisation, and inflexibility. There 
should be no confusion with the Ford Foundation which has 
often supported sharply contrasting approaches similar to 
those advocated in this paper. 
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A NEW ADMINISTRATION: BEYOND FORDISM AND THE SELF-DECEIVING STATE 
Changing Paradigms of Development 
The 1990s start with recognition that past models of world order and 
development have been not only inadequate, but dangerous. Across a wide 
front, oíd beliefs and attitudes are questioned. Perhaps in all human 
history, there has never been a period as dramatic as the late 1980s for 
changes of view about the human condition. The more obvious aspects are 
political - glasnost, the cold war thaw, the dissolution of frontiers in 
Europe, and world-wide trends towards democracy; and environmental - the 
thinning of the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect, pollution, the loss of 
tropical rainforests, and other concerns contributing to green awareness 
as a mass phenomenon. Less striking and less obvious, but also important, 
have been changing views of the ends and means of development, of the 
social institutions to support and sustain them, and of the role of the 
state. 
Regarding these, three clusters of view, paradigms or ideologies can be 
distinguished: neo-Fabian, neo-Liberal, and third, an ideology of reversáis 
(Chambers 1 9 8 9 ) . The neo-Fabian ideology is a survival from the 1970s and 
earlier; the neo-Liberal is a creature of the 1980s; and the third ideology 
has been evolving and coalescing over a long period, but gaining support 
and coherence during the 1980s. The normative thrusts and themes of this 
third ideology include: 
- putting people before things, and poor people first 
- development through learning process rather than blueprint 
- decentralisation, diversity and differentiation 
- local knowledge empowerment participation and small group action 
- individual and household self-sufficiency and self-reliance 
- open and effective communications and access 
There is much that could be added about tolerance, human rights, the rule 
of law, freedom from hunger and disease, and other ideáis; but these have a 
longer history. What is especially new is the valué placed on adaptive and 
iterative rather than linear processes, on learning and changing rather 
than implementing a set plan, and on diversity and differentness. By no 
means too soon, ecological thinking has influenced economic and social 
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thinking. Development is seen as divergent as well as convergent, as 
differentiating as well as standardising. Diversity of people, social 
systems, and ecosystems are recognised as both necessary and good. 
Normal professionalism and normal bureaucracy 
While these ideas gain currency especially among intellectuals and non-
government organisations (NGOs), two massive forces maintain the status 
quo. These are normal professionalism, meaning the ideas, thinking, 
methods and behaviour dominant in professions, and normal bureaucracy, 
meaning the characteristics found in large, especially government, 
organisations (Chambers 1986,1988b). Normal professionalism reproduces 
itself through hierarchical learning, university curricula and 
examinations, textbooks written by potboiling middle-aged men, professional 
societies, journal editors, and the traditions and rewards of the 
government departments into which graduates pass after university and 
college. It valúes things more than people, numbers more than judgements, 
high technology more than low, and whatever is urban, industrial, clean, 
hard and odourless more than whatever is rural, agricultural, dirty, soft 
and smelly. For its part, normal bureaucracy reproduces itself in the 
Weberian idiom as professionals climb the ladders of hierarchy by 
conforming to convention, avoiding error and abjuring innovation. It 
valúes central authority, standardisation, regularity, conformity, and 
quantitative targets. 
Normal professionalism and normal bureaucracy are antithetical to the new 
views of development. Combined, they oppose the characteristics of the new 
paradigm. In spite of this, some changes are occurring in development 
professionalism. These are reflected in a burgeoning literature on 
indigenous technical knowledge, on development alternatives, on the NGO 
sector, on women's issues, people's participation and the like. In 
contrast, government development bureaucracy has changed rather little. In 
an attempt to understand why, and how change might be sought, recent and 
current Indian field bureaucracy, meaning mainly rural administration by 
government departments, will be examined, seeking to identify 
characteristics likely to be found also elsewhere. 
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Administrative Stasis 
In its activities, Indian field bureaucracy both changes and does not 
change. 
It changes in the programmes which it carries out. The books by retired 
administrators about rural development in India during their lifetimes make 
this clear. In devising and promulgating programmes there has been 
imagination and inventiveness. Special programme has followed special 
programme - for different types of disadvantaged district, for different 
types of disadvantaged person, for the development of water and wastelands, 
for social forestry, seasonal employment, credit, productive assets for the 
poor, midday meáis for schoolchildren, housing for vulnerable groups, adult 
literacy, and much, much else. The range of activities undertaken has been 
impressively wide. 
At the same time, Indian field bureaucracy changes rather little in its 
structure and norms. These reproduce themselves. Innovations are absorbed 
and transformed with reversión to type. The same District administration 
headed by a Collector or Magistrate, and with a hierarchy of Block 
Development Officers and lower staff, implements many of the programmes. 
Planning is top-down. Ideas are conceived in Delhi or in the State 
capitals and promulgated as instructions with funds to be disbursed and 
targets to be achieved. Districts and blocks are told what to do. 
Whatever the programme, the style is the same, or becomes the same. One 
programme, DWCRA, for women's employment, was initiated in the early 1980s 
with a planning workshop in Delhi. It was agreed unanimously that no 
targets should be set; but within a year targets were there. Central 
conception is transmitted for peripheral implementation, and in the 
process, as though subject to a magnetic field, it becomes standardised and 
target-oriented like all other programmes. How things are done is 
determined by a dutiful homoeostasis. 
Combined, the progression of programmes and the stasis of style have 
achieved much. In trying to understand the stability of the top-down mode, 
the tone of what follows will be largely negative. This should not detract 
from what has been achieved, especially in extending and maintaining rural 
infrastructure, in dealing with natural calamities, in supporting the poor, 
and in administering and attempting to develop a country of some 8 5 O 
million people. 
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In explaining the stable continuity of Indian administration, we can start 
with three pervasive aspects: culture, conservatism and corruption. 
Cultural dimensions appear significant. Hierarchy is a deep structure in 
Indian culture, thought and behaviour. Linked with this, the Hindú concept 
of dharma, or roughly "duty", is a strong forcé. Stanley Heginbotham's 
observations fifteen years ago may still apply quite widely, more notably 
at the lower levels of administration: 
"..the dharmic tradition provides its adherents with a set of 
norms relating to work that differ in many important ways from 
the norms of a growth- and change-oriented society. It does 
not prepare an individual for situations of work overload. The 
concept of setting priorities is a foreign one, as is the 
notion of calculating costs and benefits in order to determine 
optimal work strategies. One does not strive to achieve 
results, ñor does one feel concern if the performance of one's 
duty produces what appear to be undesired consequences. One 
keeps to established procedures and standards - neither seeking 
innovations ñor quality of work that exceeds the traditional 
system-maintaining norms" 
(Heginbotham 1975:3^). 
Hierarchy and the dharmic tradition reinforce the second aspect, the 
conservatism found at the lower levels of most bureaucracies. A reverence 
is shown for behaviour which is correct and approved. Rules and procedures 
may be bent or used in ways not intended, but the outward form is 
respected, giving a sort of liturgical pleasure to those who master its 
sequences and observances, even when it is exploited for private rents. 
Procedures tend to be additive: new ones are superimposed upon oíd, while 
1 the oíd are preserved. Rules and lists tend to be for ever, reproduced 
1. The effect can be maddening, or sometimes, for the antiquarian, an 
intriguing delight. In 1989 courteous and helpful officials of the 
Government of Andhra Pradesh have issued me with an International 
Driving Permit. The contracting states for which this is valid are a 
litany from my stamp-collecting childhood, including French India, 
Curacao, Lithuania, Sambilan, Pahang, Colony of Gold Coast and 
Ashanti, Free City of Dantzing (sic) (annexed by Hitler in 1939) and 
Saar Territory (annexed by Hitler in 1935)- To the duplicated list 
of countries have been added the United States of America and Cañada; 
but no country, it would seem, has been deleted or updated. 
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more or less faithfully, unless there is strong reason to change them; and 
when there is reason to change, adding and patching are preferred to 
abolition or restructuring. 
The third factor is corruption. This includes informal fees for services, 
división of spoils, and the transfer trade. Informal fees for services 
rendered vary by región but are sometimes almost formal - with a well known 
and well understood fee for obtain a form, registering a land title, and so 
on. División of spoils from kickbacks reportedly follows well established 
"bureaucratic" norms, with set percentages from contracts and other illicit 
monies which are distributed as rents to different officers, especially at 
the lower levels. At higher levels, as analysed by Wade (1984) and 
corroborated by articles in the press, the transfer trade is widespread. 
Officials buy posts from the politicians who control them. Partly in 
consequence, the frequency of transfer from post to post "is typically so 
high as to make difficult any engagement between the official and his 
particular responsibilities" (ibid:l). There are officers who courageously 
stand out against this system. But generally, in these circumstances, 
there is little incentive or opportunity for an official to institute 
reforms. Indeed, where they do so, a penal posting is the usual prompt 
reward: Arun Bhatia, the Collector of Dhule District in Maharashtra who 
exposed corruption in the Employment Guarantee Scheme was quickly given the 
opportunity to exercise his talents as officer in charge of the Maharashtra 
Government's filing system. The transfer trade is a slipping clutch in 
development, oiled by money and preventing engagement and effective drive. 
The effects are conservative. Lower-level staff have a strong financial 
stake in the status quo. Almost any reform would reduce their incomes 
(Chambers, Saxena and Shah 1989:232). For their part, middle-level and 
sénior officers involved in the transfer trade need to recover the outlays 
and redeem the commitments made to obtain their posts, and to make a 
profit. If they threaten vested Ínterests, or stay outside the system, they 
are vulnerable to transfer to penal postings or backwaters. The incentives 
and disincentives of the system make it a model of sustainability. 
s Planning and Execution 
In these conditions, in which structural reform is so difficult, the 
dominant option perceived has been Fordist planning and implementation. In 
the neo-Fabian tradition, Indian governance is outstanding for the faith it 
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manifests in planning and in direct administration for development. Plans 
and programmes are conceived centrally and instructions and incentives 
issued to states; and the same pattern occurs at the State level. Uniform 
prescriptions are made centrally for whole regions or for the whole 
country. A striking example has been the Technology Missions set up in the 
Prime Minister's Office under Rajiv Gandhi - for adult literacy, 
telecommunications, water supply, immunisation, oilseeds, and finally 
wastelands development. In Fordist style, they have sought to transfer and 
implement standard technologies and treatments. 
Other examples can be found in other specialised programmes which have been 
implemented and studied over longer periods. Three to be examined here 
have been associated with the World Bank as well as the Government of 
India. They concern the Training and Visit (T and V) system of 
agricultural extensión; on-farm development and the warabandi system of 
canal irrigation water distribution; and standard treatments in watershed 
management. 
First, the Training and Visit system represented an attempt at bold and 
radical change. Earlier, agricultural extensión was the responsibility of 
Village Level Workers responsible not only to the Department or Ministry of 
Agriculture, but also to other departments. They were often expected to 
implement an impossible number and variety of programmes. They were 
overwhelmed and buried under geological layers of instructions from 
different masters. Reporting requirements alone took much of their time. 
The T and V reform sought to make them responsible only for agriculture and 
only to one department, to programme their work so that their supervisors 
would know each day where they were and what they were doing, and to 
institute regular meetings and training. They were to propagate and 
popularise appropriate packages of practices through contact farmers. T 
and V was introduced in most Indian States and had strengths, but is now 
spoken of in the past tense. A major shortcoming it revealed was that good 
standard extensión recommendations were often not available or not possible 
for the diverse and difficult conditions of much Indian farming. 
Second, on-farm development and the warabandi system are two examples from 
canal irrigation. 
On-farm development under the Command Area Development Programme has 
entailed survey, design and construction of field channels to connect 
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canals with farmers' fields. Based on a top-down diagnosis and implemented 
in a top-down, non-participatory mode, the fit with local conditions has 
been poor. The programme has, however, persisted, even though analysis has 
suggested that the first priority in canal irrigation lies not in on-farm 
development but in management of the main system of water distribution. 
For its part, the warabandi system of canal irrigation water distribution 
entails timed turns for farmers to take water.(For a fuller account see 
Chambers 1988a:92~99)• Warabandi is successfully practised in parts of 
Northwest India where four conditions are met: water is scarce and rainfall 
low; landholdings are Consolidated with clear ownership; channels lead to 
individual fields; and a constant flow can physically be assured through 
the outlet which supplies a group of farmers. In these conditions, farmers 
will accept timed turns proportional to their land, and will irrígate at 
night. Unfortunately, these same conditions are rare in India outside the 
Northwest. This did not deter the Seventh Five Year Plan from setting a 
target of 8 million hectares to be brought under new warabandi during the 
plan period. The blueprint was to be transferred and imposed in widely 
differing environments where it did not fit. Rarely did the necessary 
preconditions exist. The outcome was almost universal failure. Boards 
giving ñames and times for taking water were erected on canals; but they 
were a facade. Almost everywhere, farmers ignored them. 
Watershed management is a third example. Deforestation, erosion, the 
siltation of dams and lakes, the drying up of springs, and other 
environmental concerns have focussed attention and priority on watershed 
management. Over the years there have been at least 40 pilot projects 
where watersheds have been treated, more recently with World Bank support. 
As the programmes have been scaled up, treatments have become more 
standardised, physical and disbursement targets have been set, and despite 
a rhetoric of participation, implementation has been top-down, with little 
cónsultation and sometimes not even consent from farmers for their lands to 
be treated. Whereas farmers live with their land through the seasons and 
years, soil conservation engineers come once or twice, move the earth or 
plant the grass, and then leave, without further responsibility. At the 
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level of micro-topography, the fit between the works and the land is often 
poor. Engineers tend not to consult farmers about detail, and even to 
ignore their advice and requests. 
An example is the Maheshwaram watershed near Hyderabad. There, the 
standard treatments have changed over a few years but not the style. 
Contour earth bunds on farmers' fields were at first put in. In areas 
treated later, these were replaced by vegetative bunds of khus grass 
(Vetiveria zizanioides), a technology promoted enthusiastically by the 
World Bank over large and diverse areas in India. A special study of the 
Maheshwaram programme (Sitapathi Rao et al 1989) has found many 
shortcomings, including lack of consultation and participation, ploughing 
in of bunds by dissatisfied farmers who did not want them, erosion actually 
resulting from anti-erosion bunds, and cause for doubt about the universal 
efficacy.of khus grass. Nevertheless, the Planning Commission is said 
(November I 9 8 9 ) to be proposing a target of 5 million hectares per annum 
for watershed management treatment during the Eight Plan Period. 
As with T and V and warabandi earlier, so now with watershed management, 
the tendency is to transfer and imprint standard technologies on diverse 
conditions. The likelihood is another massive programme on a vast 
nationwide scale, with targets for expenditure and implementation 
disaggregated down to low levels of administration, and reported on, 
monitored and evaluated, but without major changes or adjustments, until it 
is superseded by a new priority in the next new Five Year Plan. Yet field 
level investigations suggest that this will not work well, and may well be 
a disaster. 
There is a question to be answered. When field level realities suggest 
widespread misfit and failure, how is it that such inappropriate programmes 
continué to be planned and implemented? There is something to explain. 
The Self-deceiving State 
Answers can be given in terms of normal bureaucracy in its many aspects, of 
traditions of planning, of hierarchical culture and of sheer Fabian 
conservatism. But perhaps more important, because more open to change, is 
homoeostasis based on false positive feedback, on misperceptions and 
misinformation. There are dangers here of exaggeration. The Programme 
Evaluation Organisation of the Planning Commission, for example, has had a 
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good track record with its investigations and reporting which Northern 
countries could do well to emulate. But most of the time, for most 
organisations and programmes, normal misinformation cloaks the truth: the 
King, though naked, is reported by sources cióse to him to have clothes. 
Five types of impressions and information combine to give this positive 
bias. 
The first is rural development tourism, the brief rural visit by the urban-
based sénior officer. Such visits are carefully orchestrated and planned 
by local-level staff. Block development staff often have a special 
village, and special "tame" people in that village, to solve the problem of 
what to do with visitors and how to give them a good impression. Canal 
irrigation staff have special "islands of salvation" which receive 
privileged water supplies and systematically mislead visitors, and through 
them planners and international development specialists (Chambers 1988, 
chapters 3~5)« Farmers are even rehearsed in the answers they are to give. 
A warabandi committee is mustered, even though it only exists when visitors 
come. Only the best is shown and seen. Tarmac bias is pronounced. On a 
stock visit to a watershed project, for example, no erosion caused by earth 
bunds is visible, although a walk of a few hundred metres from the tarmac 
would quickly discover it. A World Bank visitor is taken to a special 
place where the latest technology, now Vetiver grass, is seen to be doing 
well. Soil and Water Conservation staff will be shown the demonstration 
area, chosen because like the research station, it is on an even sloping 
plañe. It is suitable for contour ploughing, unlike undulating land with 
small gullies where contour bunds and contour ploughing can cause, rather 
than prevent, erosion. That undulating land, and that erosion, are not 
seen. Rural visits thus often leave misleading impressions which visitors 
rarely recognise. Worse, the more sénior and influential the visitor, the 
more elabórate the preparations will be, and the more biased the 
impressions gained. The glowing words of the VIP in the visitor's book 
then reflect not the wider reality, but atypical hothouse conditions of the 
island of salvation, and the skill and care with which the visit was 
arranged. 
The second source of bias is subsidy. Most rural development programmes in 
India are subsidised. The arguments for subsidy are several: that it is 
equitable, providing assistance to a target poor group; that without a 
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subsidy, farmers would not adopt a practice; that a subsidy is needed to 
allow poor people to accumulate working capital so that they can afford 
subsequently to sustain a practice. Whatever the merit of these arguments, 
the effect of subsidies is often to induce farmers or others to adopt a 
practice which they otherwise would not, later abandoning it when the 
subsidy is withdrawn. The subsidy gives a misleading impression that a 
practice fits a need, and is what people want; and it inhibits learning by 
staff about the true priorities of poor people. The sustainable outcome of 
subsidies is then not adoption of technology but professional ignorance. 
The third source of bias is lies, meaning deliberate and conscious 
falsification. Subsidies play a part here too. In practice subsidies 
support corruption, providing a surplus which can be extracted as rents. 
Subsidised assets or inputs are also patronage as the hands of staff can 
make them available to those for whom they were not intended. Reporting 
cannot, however, reveal this. As more generally, information has to be 
falsified to conceal corruption; and when corruption is endemic and 
widespread, so is false information. So work is reported done which has 
not been done, and workers reported paid who have not been paid. Costs are 
inflated. In a recent (1989) case this was by a factor of four: a Forest 
Department was accounting a cost of Rs40 per running metre of protective 
stone walling, when an NGO working on the ground found the cost to be only 
RslO. Or again, administrators receive figures which they know are false, 
and are then ordered by politicians to falsify them further. In one 
technical department, the annual meeting of some 500 sénior staff is said 
to have been confronted by their Chief Statistical Officer who asked: "Why 
do you all lie?". There was no reply. The question was repeated. There 
was still no reply. Perhaps the truth was that truth does not pay. 
The fourth source of bias is the very methods used for investigation. 
Perhaps especially in rural India, informants give prudent, defensive and 
deferential replies to avoid trouble, ridicule or being lectured at, to 
present themselves in a good light, and to secúre benefits. An individual 
questionnaire survey in the Maheshwaram watershed near Hyderabad recently 
found only one farmer out of 272 (0.4 per cent) who admitted to the 
traditional method of crossploughing which is not recommended by Government 
staff. Since extensive crossploughing was observed in the fields, this 
lack of response was checked in group interviews. After group discussions 
of ploughing practices, 28 per cent then said they crossploughed (C. 
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Sitapathi Rao, pers. comm.). More seriously and more generally, Dreze 
(1988) has shown through analysis of evaluation methods for the major anti-
poverty programme, the IRDP (Integrated Rural Development Programme) that 
errors generated by the methods themselves are likely to have inflated the 
performance figures. The IRDP is intended to raise households from below 
to above the poverty line. To take but one illustration, in the Concurrent 
Evaluation of the IRDP in Gujarat, investigators had to assess 
retrospectively whether beneficiarles had been below the poverty line three 
years earlier, with the testimony of respondents as the dominant source of 
information. It is difficult to imagine that they did not know the "right" 
answer. Not surprisingly almost all (96 per cent) said that they had been 
below the poverty line, a finding which conflicted with micro-level 
evidence that the programme did not substantially involve the most 
vulnerable groups but to a large extent supported those who were relatively 
well-off. 
A final source of bias is the consultancy or research report. Few who have 
been cónsultants will wish to throw stones with confident enthusiasm. Most 
of us have sinned. There are many shades and subtleties, conscious and 
unconscious, of self-censorship and choice of words. Even in writing an 
academic paper one may hesitate to offend, as I did above before using the 
word "lies". For those whose livelihoods, and whose institutions, depend 
on a flow of commissions for consultancy and research, the temptation can 
be strong indeed to pulí punches and edit out unpalatable truth which might 
prejudice future contracts. 
The compounded effects of these biases are conservative. They maintain the 
status quo, and reinforce top-down reflexes. The single universal solution 
when inspected on rural visits is seen to do well; routine reports rarely 
dawn; though local conditions differ, evidence of misfits if filtered out. 
So the standard blueprint seems sound; warabandi to be implemented on all 
irrigation systems; contour earth bunds, or Vetiver grass, for most or all 
watershed development. Positive misinformation supports standard 
programmes. Fordism is sustained by false feedback. The state deceives 
itself. 
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A New Administration: reversáis and local diversity 
The new paradigm for development reduces or removes false feedback. It 
reverses normal top-down, centre-outwards, uniform Fordist prescriptions, 
with their demands for standardised data from below. The reversáis entail 
decentralisation, participation, and diversity. Diagnosis occurs locally, 
face-to-face with field reality. Those who investigate and analyse have an 
interest in truth and accuracy, since they are the users of the 
information. 
These reversáis, and the new administration they imply, can be illustrated 
by applications in the three fields already discussed - agricultural 
research and extensión, canal irrigation, and watershed management. In 
each case, new patterns with better local fit are being evolved. 
i. farmer first 
"Farmer first", also described as farmer participatory research (Farrington 
and Martin 1 9 8 8 ) refers to new approaches in agricultural research and 
extensión which contrast with those of "transfer of technology" (TOT) 
(Chambers, Pacey and Thrupp 1 9 8 9 ) . 
In the TOT mode, research priorities are decided by scientists; technology 
is developed by scientists on research stations and in laboratories; and 
recommended package of practices are then passed to Extensión for transfer 
to farmers. TOT has had successes with some green revolution agriculture 
where environments are controlled and uniform, but has a poor record with 
rainfed agriculture which is more complex, diverse and risky. In the 
contrasting farmer-first mode, analysis is carried out more by farmers 
assisted by scientists; technology is developed much more on farm and by 
farmer; baskets of choices for farmers are presented to enhance their 
adaptability; and farmers* own experiments are supported. 
Seed-breeding presents a striking illustration of the contrast between TOT 
and farmer first. In the normal professional mode of TOT in India, 
breeders make crosses, screen lines for good characteristics such as 
disease resistance and yield, and then select only a very few, perhaps two 
or three, out of as many as two hundred lines for assessment by a 
committee. This committee chooses material for multi-locational testing, 
following which those lines which do best are chosen, certified, and passed 
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for seed multiplication and transfer to Extensión. Before "adoption", 
farmers play no part, and much promising genetic material is lost. In 
contrast, D.M.Maurya ( 1 9 8 8 , 1 9 8 9 ) of the Narendra Dev, University of 
Agriculture and Technology, Faizabad, has been making a wider range of 
lines available directly to farmers for them to try out, with the condition 
that if other farmers ask for seed, they will also give some back to him. 
Farmers thus themselves test, evalúate and disseminate. The results to 
date have been good. 
Farmers' own diagnosis and analysis are another aspect of the farmer first 
approach. Usually these are undertaken by groups of farmers rather than 
individuáis. To take one example, initially in the Philippines but now 
also in India, farmers have been enabled to use systems diagraming to 
identify problems and solutions (Pedro and Repulda 1987; Lightfoot et al. 
1989). 
ii. community organisers 
With canal irrigation, participatory approaches have been developed in the 
Philippines (Bagadion and Korten 1985). in Sri Lanka (Uphoff 1 9 8 6 ) and now 
on a small scale in India. Young staff are recruited within Government to 
act as what are variously known as Community Organisers or Institutional 
Organisers. Their activities have varied, but in all cases they have acted 
as catalysts for the formation of irrigators" groups which have taken 
responsibility for physical and managerial improvements. 
In India, the innovator has been a sénior officer who recruited, trained 
and supervised Community Organisers on the Lower Bhavani Irrigation Project 
in Tamil Nadu. Local groups have been formed to take over much of the work 
of on-farm development including influencing design and supervising 
construction. 
iii. National Water Management Project 
With World Bank support and encouragement, the Indian Government has 
initiated a National Water Management Project in which each canal 
irrigation project is treated as a separate entity (Chambers 1 9 8 8 : 2 3 8 - 9 ) . 
This contrasts with the Command Area Development and warabandi approaches 
in which the same solutions and procedures were prescribed for all systems. 
In the National Water Management Project, the key activities are 
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participatory appraisal involving an outside team and local managerial 
staff. This concentrates on preparing an operational plan. Each plan is 
evolved separately and focuses on the software of management of the main 
system, including the scheduling and distribution of water. The plan may 
draw on the standard solutions of other programmes, but is individually 
tailored, and modified season by season as experience is gained. 
iv. watershed management and participatory rural appraisal 
The rhetoric of watershed management is participatory but the reality 
largely top down implementation of standard interventions. As in other 
domains of rural development, the fashion is to turn to the NGO sector for 
solutions. But the main challenge, as with canal irrigation on-farm 
development, is to evolve institutions and approaches within Government 
which can be both large-scale and truly participatory. 
Although this has not been achieved, pilot participatory rural appraisal 
undertaken by MYRADA, an NGO, in Karnataka, has led to ideas for exploiting 
some aspects of normal bureaucracy to induce a reorientation of staff and a 
participatory approach. The participatory rural appraisal found that there 
was already much ingenious soil and water conservation and concentration 
undertaken by farmers. To help analysis, farmers made a physical model of 
the watershed on the ground. Following these experiences, the suggestion 
is that before Government staff undertake any soil and water conservation 
work in an area, they must be able to show: 
a. a set of photographs displayed in their offices of all local soil and 
water conservation and concentration practices 
b. similarly displayed, diagrammatic maps of all major nallas (large 
gullies and water courses) based on walking down through them, and 
observing and recording conditions and practices. 
c. a physical model of the watershed made by those who farm in it. 
Whether such an approach would be widely replicable without being somehow 
subverted is not known; but it has the merit of trying to use a standard 
procedure and the norm of physical inspection by supervisors to induce 
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learning from farmers and farmers* participation. Aspects of Fordist 
administration would thus be exploited to promote its opposite, local 
analysis, participation, and differentiation to fit diversity. 
Resources. Rights and Information 
These programmes and proposals are specific and specialised - for 
agricultural research and extensión, canal irrigation, and watershed 
management. Precisely because they are specialised, they throw detailed 
light on contrasting modes of administration. They present examples and 
opportunities for bureaucratic and professional change, with local 
differentiation and diversity. But there is also a much scope concerning 
resources, rights and information. 
Wide scope for reversáis lies in decentralisation of authority and control 
of resources. Karnataka State has already implemented a radical 
decentralisation. Nationally, the Congress (I) party proposed before the 
November 1989 election, a form of decentralisation in which funds would be 
made available for discretionary use direct to the village level. Such 
decentralisation raises questions of local power structures, and of who 
gains and who loses, but also promises a better local fit between needs and 
actions. It has the potential to develop local confidence and capacity to 
analyse and act, and to provide a supporting environment for reversáis. If 
resolutely implemented and sustained, such decentralisation could prove the 
most significant reversal. 
Communications are also a key part of the new paradigm for development 
(Jamieson n.d.). The information revolution of the 1990s can be expected 
to have profound effects on rural life, in India as elsewhere. Múltiple 
channels of communication will continué to open up and become more 
accessible to rural people. These could be used for partisan or even 
totalitarian purposes, but such use would now be likely to backfire. One 
major opportunity lies in abolishing regulations and restrictions which 
lead to rent-seeking by officials, and making the abolitions widely known 
(Chambers, Saxena and Shah 1989: 2 3 8 - 9 ) . More generally, whether it is 
water supply on canal irrigation systems, market price trends, rights to 
services, legal entitlements and protection against intimidation, 
exploitation and violence, access to credit, freedom from restrictions on 
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cutting and transporting trees and their products, or any other aspect of 
rights, reliable and authoritative information is empowering, and the more 
so when it is reinforced through múltiple channels. 
Potentials also exist for citizens themselves to obtain and use 
information, and for the lateral transfer of this "technology". Corruption 
at the grassroots sometimes appears an ecological condition as unalterable 
as climate, a fact of life to be accepted. But at Ahmadpur in Latur 
District in India, a voluntary agency brought out a handbill which said: 
"Report a case of corruption and get the bribe-money back" 
Villagers met on an appointed day and testified to payments made. 
Officials were told that prosecution was not sought, only return of the 
money. The results were dramatic. Some officials asked for time to pay, 
but in all cases bribes were returned, the sums being designated as money 
that had been "lent" (Joshi 1989). Should lateral transfer of this 
approach prove feasible, the effects on administrative behaviour might be 
profound. 
Information, organisation and empowerment at the grassroots are, in sum, 
correctives to rent-seeking officialdom and to the self-deceiving state. 
Honesty and accuracy can be enforced by those with local knowledge when 
they have the power of solidarity and knowledge. The reversáis implied 
will be resisted by those - mainly lower-level officials - who stand to 
lose their rents. But the control of policy and information resides higher 
up in the hierarchy, in central administrative places; and as with the 
Karnataka decentralisation, that control can be used to support reversáis 
as and when political leaders and officials so decide. 
Personal Reversáis and a New Administration 
In the evolution of a new administration, there are questions of who starts 
and where. Rights, information and empowerment depend on decisions to 
clarify rights, to disseminate information, and to encourage the formation 
of local organisations. Those in a position to take those decisions are 
then one of the keys. 
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The mental reversáis required are not easy. The normal pathology of the 
self-deceiving state is mirrored by the normal pathology of self-deceiving 
professions. Even psychotherapists themselves, supposedly expert on 
psychological pathology, are unselfcritical, assume that patients benefit 
from their treatment, lack feedback on the effectiveness of their work, 
and, most significantly, do not seem interested in it (Howarth 1989)• 
Officials, trapped in hierarchy and enveloped by a corrupt environment and 
misinformation, can seem to have little incentive for change and little 
room for manoeuvre. All one can say, is that again and again individuáis 
do show courage and conviction. There is a question here of critical mass. 
As with the unpredicted (and five years ago unthinkable) transformation of 
Russia and Eastern Europe and of the Cold War, so with large bureaucracies 
like those of India, unpredicted and apparently improbable change may be 
closer than "realists" suppose. 
In supporting reversáis by individuáis, two final thrusts can be indicated. 
The first concerns officials. Methods of rapid rural appraisal have 
themselves evolved rapidly in the latter 1980s. They now present a wide 
repertoire of means for learning from rural people and about rural 
conditions. Besides requiring relatively brief periods in the field, using 
their techniques is also interesting and enjoyable. The question is 
whether they can be used by more officials, at different levels, to effect 
reversáis of learning, from below not just from above, keeping up-to-date 
with change, and being sensitive to the priorities of people, especially 
the poorer, rather than the priorities perceived by normal professionals. 
The second concerns outsiders to Government. The roles and actions of 
those working in NGOs, in aid agencies and foundations, and in social 
science research, all deserve more exploration and analysis. In the 
development of a new administration NGOs have a mode in forming and 
empowering groups, in developing procedures and approaches for adoption by 
Government, and in training officials. Aid agencies and foundations, most 
notably the Ford Foundation, have shown a capacity for professional and 
funding support for bureaucratic reorientation (see e.g. Bagadion and 
Korten 1 9 8 5 ) , but to be effective such support requires a continuity rare 
among aid agencies. For their part, social science researchers may be able 
to contribute more at the margin through action research, learning about 
the world by trying to change it, than through simply studying what exists. 
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Action science (Argyris et al 1987) has its own rigour, and its own 
comparative advantages in learning, not least in the understanding of the 
defensive routines of individuáis and organisations that resist change. 
Psychology, which has played so little part in development, might come into 
its own with recognition of the primacy of individual decisions to change 
behaviour. 
For Fordism to be phased out of Government administration will remain more 
difficult than in the private sector. Not least, the sanction of the 
market is missing. Many initiatives are needed, and many reversáis. For 
the 1990s and beyond, information and organisation are a promising means 
for change. They could empower popular demand from below to moderate 
Fordism and reduce falsehood in Government administration. The discipline 
which market forces exercise for the private sector would then be provided 
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